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Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum:
An Empirical Analysis of Corporate
Merger Agreements
Theodore Eisenberg
Geoffrey Miller 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1975 (2006)
Legal scholars have focused much attention on the
incorporation puzzle-why business corporations so heavily favor
Delaware as the site of incorporation. This paper suggests that the
focus on the incorporation decision overlooks a broader but
intimately related set of questions. The choice of Delaware as a situs
of incorporation is, effectively, a choice of law decision. A company
electing to charter in Delaware selects Delaware law (and authorizes
Delaware courts to adjudicate legal disputes) regarding the
allocation of governance authority within the firm. In this sense, the
incorporation decision is fundamentally similar to any setting in
which a company selects a law and authorizes (or selects) a forum in
which disputes are to be resolved.
We study a data set of 412 merger and acquisition contracts
contained as exhibits in SEC Form 8-K filings by reporting
corporations over a seven month period in 2002 in order to assess the
decisions the parties have made regarding choice of law and choice
of forum. We find that, although these contracts frequently select
Delaware law and forum, there is a relative "flight" from Delaware
in the contractual setting. Delaware corporations tend to choose
Delaware law less than other corporations choose the law of their
states of incorporation. Furthermore, in those contracts specifying
Delaware law, many firms do not specify Delaware as the litigation
forum. Corporations that choose Delaware law tend to choose
Delaware as a litigation forum less than corporations that choose
other states' laws tend to choose such states as a litigation forum.
Delaware was the place of incorporation for 189 merger contracts; it
was the choice of law for 132. With respect to forum selection, 115
contracts that designated a forum had Delaware corporate
acquirers. Yet only sixty-four contracts specified Delaware as the
litigation forum. In contrast, for example, New York had eight
corporate acquirers and forty-five contracts specifying that New
York law governed. We investigate the determinants underlying
these decisions about choice of law and forum selection. Regression
results confirm the flight from Delaware law and forum, conditional
on Delaware being the acquiring firm's place of incorporation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A leading question in American corporate law is why such a
large percentage of large firms choose Delaware as their state of
incorporation. An early view saw Delaware as leading a "race to the
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bottom" by providing charter terms that favored corporate managers
at the expense of shareholders and the public at large.1 Later theorists
postulated that Delaware might rather be providing terms that
benefited all parties to the corporate contract ex ante-the "race to the
top" view. 2 Some have suggested that Delaware incorporation may
represent neither a race to the top nor to the bottom, but rather a race
to somewhere in the middle, because the interests of corporate
managers and other influential parties align only partially with the
interests of the public.3 More recently, the notion of beneficial
competition among the states for corporate charters has been
challenged on the grounds either that state competition may not
produce value-increasing rules; 4 that Delaware's dominance is so great
that effective competition does not exist, 5 at least with any state other
than the firm's principal place of business; 6 or that the most salient
competition is not between states but rather between states and the
federal government.7 Others have examined the role of attorneys in
1. See generally William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (arguing that Delaware corporate law attracts corporations because it
has historically favored managers at the expense of shareholders).
2. See generally ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993)
(arguing that state competition for charters has created a system that benefits investors); Daniel
R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's
Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913 (1982) (arguing that a line of Delaware court cases
departing from pro-management rules will harm shareholders); Roberta Romano, The Political
Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987) (arguing that Delaware's reluctance to
adopt anti-takeover regulations reflects shareholder preference); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State
Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977)
(supporting the economic theory that competitive corporate legal systems promote optimality for
shareholders).
3. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987) (stating that Delaware law is the
result of a political equilibrium between interest groups on the "supply side," namely Delaware
taxpayers and attorneys, and the "demand side," namely out-of-state shareholders and
managers).
4. See generally Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1435 (1992) (arguing that
managerial opportunism and externalities can influence states in adopting undesirable corporate
laws); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (1989)
(arguing that competition for charters has led Delaware to sacrifice optimality for pro-
management rules).
5. See generally Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in
Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002) (arguing that only Delaware stands to earn
substantial tax revenues and legal work from incorporation, so other states do not compete).
6. See generally Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1559 (2002) (asserting that firms make a binary choice between Delaware and their home states
when deciding where to incorporate).
7. See generally Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003)
(arguing that regardless of whether Delaware "raced to the top" or "raced to the bottom," it was
influenced more by the threat of federal action than by state competition).
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the process, arguing that the self-interest of transactional attorneys
influences the selection of Delaware as a chartering state,8 as well as
the nature of the contractual clauses that are included in the
charters.9 Studies also have used empirical methods to investigate the
advantages of Delaware incorporation, with some finding advantages
to incorporating in Delaware10 and others casting doubt on the
robustness of these results.11
The benefits of Delaware corporate law are said to lie, among
other things, in its flexibility and openness to variation, with most
provisions operating only as default rules that can be avoided by
contrary provisions in the corporate charter or bylaws; 12 the high
degree of competence, specialized knowledge, and integrity of the
state's judiciary; 13 the substantial body of decided cases, which lends
predictability and reliability to its corporate law; 14 Delaware's reliance
on corporate franchise taxes, which ensures that legislators will think
twice about making changes to the law that corporate managers would
not desire; 15 and the relative insulation of the Delaware lawmaking
process from special interests hostile to corporate interests. 6
8. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225, 273-77 (1985) (arguing that attorneys reduce their labor costs by developing
an expertise in Delaware law because Delaware is a single jurisdiction where outcomes are more
predictable).
9. See generally John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the
Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301 (2001) (claiming that the advice a law firm gives a corporation has
more influence on whether it will adopt takeover defenses than other more traditional variables).
10. See generally Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON.
525 (2001) (finding that Delaware firms are worth substantially more than non-Delaware firms).
11. See generally Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 32 (2004) (finding that small Delaware firms were not worth more than small non-
Delaware firms between 1996 and 2002 and that large Delaware firms were not more valuable
than large non-Delaware firms between 1991 and 2002).
12. E.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FIsCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAw 15 (1991).
13. See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting
Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1362 (2000) (describing
literature claiming "that Delaware, through its reliance on charter revenue and its judicial
selection process, has committed itself to provide corporate laws that enhance firm performance,
and that market forces lead firms to adopt these value-enhancing laws" (footnote omitted));
Romano, supra note 8 at 277 (arguing that Delaware is the preferred state of incorporation in
part because "the continuity in and small size of [the court that] hears corporation law cases"
produces both judicial expertise and predictable decisions).
14. Romano, supra note 8, at 274.
15. Id. at 258-61.
16. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Corporate Federalism: State Competition and
the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 759, 762-63
(1987) (arguing that Delaware continues to be "the preeminent authority on corporate-law
matters" because of lobbies within the state do not distort the law in undesirable ways).
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Sometimes overlooked in the debate over Delaware
incorporation is that the real issues at stake have to do with choices of
law and forum. Aside from franchise taxes due to the Delaware
treasury, 17 the principal consequence of Delaware incorporation is that
the company opts into Delaware law to resolve disputes going to the
allocation of power and duty within the company. 18 Delaware
incorporation also operates as a weak choice of forum decision.
Although directors and officers of companies incorporated in Delaware
are subject to that state's jurisdiction over matters growing out of
their corporate activities, 19 and Delaware may be the only state where,
as a practical matter, all defendants in a case involving alleged
breaches of fiduciary duty can be joined.20 Delaware corporate law
does not purport by its own terms to be exclusive. A plaintiff could
bring a suit in any state (or even abroad) where he or she could obtain
jurisdiction over all defendants. Delaware law would be applied
(presumably) in such a case, but the forum would be different. 21
Viewing Delaware incorporation as a choice of law and choice of
forum option permits us to understand the incorporation decision in
the context of a broader universe of corporate behavior. As shown in
Part III below, companies frequently agree to choice of law and choice
of forum provisions when they enter into contracts. These contracts
cover a wide range of corporate activities, such as employment and
severance agreements, dispute settlement, mergers and asset
purchases, financing agreements, and securities transactions. 22 Thus,
the debate over Delaware incorporation can be understood as a
specific case of a more general inquiry into the importance of choice of
law and choice of forum decisions by corporations that enter into
contracts with third parties.
Insofar as they tend to appear repetitively in corporate
contracts and use relatively standardized terminology, choice of law
17. ROMANO, supra note 2, at 6-11.
18. At least, this is the conventional view of the "internal affairs doctrine" of corporate law.
For a theoretical treatment stressing the fact that the selection of the state of incorporation is
essentially a choice of law decision see Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to
Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1162 (2000) (asserting that rules respecting
parties' choice of law decisions generally further economic efficiency).
19. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (2006); Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174, 175-79
(Del. 1980).
20. See infra Part JV.C.
21. Id.
22. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, "The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical
Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts" (October 11, 2006).
Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 06-023, available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=927423.
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and choice of forum provisions in corporate contracts may be
considered examples of contractual "boilerplate." Such a
characterization should not be taken as indicating that these clauses
are unimportant. A rich literature on boilerplate, much of it of recent
origin, suggests that despite its repetitive and standardized nature,
boilerplate can have significant efficiency effects. Scholars have
debated the fairness of boilerplate provisions for consumers, with
some decrying them as exploitative 23 and others pointing to evidence
that they sometimes function in the consumer's interests.24 A
substantial body of recent scholarship investigates other features of
boilerplate provisions, including theories about the efficiency
implications of the production of boilerplate by different forms of
organization; 25 the determinants of change in standardized terms;26
the effects of boilerplate as a device for consumer screening, price
23. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1205-06 (2003) (evaluating the assertion that form
contracts are less favorable to buyers than to sellers); Ronald J. Mann, "Contracting" for Credit,
104 MICH. L. REV. 899, 912-14 (2006) (recognizing that credit card companies are able to exploit
consumers in part by hiding unattractive contract terms within less prominent boilerplate
provisions); Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics
Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 594-603 (1990) (arguing that form contracts
disadvantage consumers because consumers are unlikely to read or understand the contract
terms, and because businesses know and exploit this fact).
24. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive
Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 829-31, 833-34 (2006) (arguing that one-sided
contract provisions allow sellers discretion and therefore enhance consumer welfare, because
sellers will exercise that discretion in a way that maintains their positive reputation among
consumers); Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How
Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers,
104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 858 (2006) (arguing that standard-form contracts benefit consumers
because the seller then has "discretion to grant exceptions ... on a case-by-case basis"); Florencia
Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts: An Empirical
Analysis of Software License Agreements 32-36 (Aug. 22, 2005) (New York Univ., Law and
Economics Research Paper No. 05-11), available at http://ssrn.comabstract=799274 (arguing
that sellers with market power do not include in their form contracts unusually biased terms,
and that form contracts therefore pose less risk to consumers than previously was thought); cf.
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are "Pay Now, Terms Later" Contracts Worse for Buyers? Evidence
from Software License Agreements 24-25 (Aug. 22, 2005) (New York Univ., Law and Economics
Research Paper No. 05-10), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=799282 (arguing that sellers of computer
software do not use "rolling contracts," where a consumer does not know the terms of the
contract until after her purchase is complete, to hide one-sided contract terms).
25. See Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1075, 1098-1102 (2006) (discussing the legal and policy implications of boilerplate
developed by for profit organizations, nonprofit organizations, and the state).
26. See generally Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An
Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929 (2004) (finding that the
standardization of boilerplate terms in sovereign bond offerings led parties to adopt terms in
spite of their preferences).
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discrimination, or cartelization; 27 the use of boilerplate as a means for
facilitating communication among sophisticated parties;28  the
efficiency tradeoff between standardization and individual tailoring of
boilerplate terms;29 the use of boilerplate in particular industries; 30
and the proper role of a court in interpreting boilerplate clauses.31 The
contributors to this evolving literature differ in many respects but
share the premise that boilerplate provisions are, or can be, important
determinants of the overall value of a contract to a party.
A substantial body of contract theory suggests, therefore, that
choice of law and choice of forum provisions may have an impact on
corporate value. Particular features of choice of law and choice of
forum provisions tend to reinforce this conviction. Although their
enforceability is sometimes challenged, courts generally give effect to
choice of law and choice of forum clauses. 32 States engage in
competition in the areas of choice of law and choice of forum that is
analogous, in important respects, to the competition for corporate
charters.33 The presence of such competition tends to indicate that
choice of law and choice of forum provisions have important real-world
consequences. 34
27. See generally David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-
Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and
Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983 (2006) (discussing the potential uses of boilerplate
provisions by suppliers to impose higher transaction costs upon consumers).
28. See generally Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1033
(2006) (examining the use of boilerplate provisions by sophisticated bargainers to achieve a
strategic advantage that is distinct from the substantive content of the boilerplate term).
29. See generally Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information
Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175 (2006) (discussing how boilerplate provisions take advantage of
modularity in striking a balance between portability and individual tailoring).
30. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in
Auto Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2006) (examining the role of boilerplate
terms in the automobile manufacturing industry).
31. See generally Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1129 (2006) (arguing that courts should interpret boilerplate provisions entered into by
sophisticated parties as if they were statutes, rather than by utilizing traditional contract
interpretation techniques).
32. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of
Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363 (2003) (empirical study finding that choice of law clauses were routinely
enforced, even when the effect was to override the regulatory law of the forum state).
33. See Larry Ribstein, Delaware, Lawyers, and Contractual Choice of Law, 19 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 999, 1007-18 (1994) (discussing state statutes compelling the enforcement of choice of
law clauses).
34. Empirical evidence suggests that forum matters in shaping case outcomes. See Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
1507, 1511-13 (1995) (finding that plaintiffs are generally less successful in cases where a forum
transfer has occurred than in cases where there was no transfer).
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Choice of law and choice of forum provisions differ from other
types of boilerplate in one important respect. The standard boilerplate
term is a clause that remains invariant across contracts (for example,
an integration clause providing that the written contract sets forth the
entire agreement of the parties). In the case of many choice of law and
choice of forum clauses, the form of the clause is standardized, but the
specific law and forum chosen by the parties are not. These must be
determined for each individual contract. The transaction-specific
tailoring of these clauses suggests additional reasons for inferring that
the specific venue and law chosen may have importance for the
contracting parties.
This Article is a preliminary inquiry into the uses of choice of
forum and choice of law clauses in corporate contracts. We study a
data set consisting of all merger and acquisition agreements contained
as exhibits to Form 8K "current report" filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) for the seven-month period January 1 to
July 31, 2002. The motivation for using this data set is described more
fully below, but the short explanation is that these contracts allow us
to examine choice of law and choice of forum clauses in a setting in
which such clauses are reasonably analogous to corporate chartering
decisions-contracts involving fundamental corporate events that are
material to the welfare of sophisticated corporate parties.
Our study yields the following conclusions. Choice of law and
choice of forum provisions appear to be negotiated vigorously in these
merger contracts. No single state dominates in either category; no
share of the market for these clauses exceeds thirty-three percent. As
might be expected, we find that a substantial degree of overlap exists
between choice of law and choice of forum designations. If a particular
state's law is chosen, that state's forum is also very likely to be
selected. The overlap, however, is not complete: A substantial number
of contracts designate a forum to adjudicate disputes that is not
located in the state whose law was selected to govern the substantive
issues. Further, and quite interestingly, we find that while the
contracting parties always opt to include choice of law provisions in
their contracts, the same is not true for choice of forum provisions.
Only fifty-three percent of the contracts contain litigation forum
selection clauses. Given that the parties could easily select the forum
as well as the applicable law-and given that the forum selected can
sometimes be as important (if not more important) than the law
chosen-the frequent failure of the parties to specify a forum for
resolution of disputes presents a theoretical puzzle.
Investigation of the determinants of a particular state law or
forum generated several results. We find a positive, significant
2006] 1981
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association between the principal places of business of both the
acquired firms and the acquiring firms and the law and forum selected
in the contract. We similarly find positive, significant associations
between the states of incorporation of the acquired and acquiring
firms and the chosen law and forum. We find lesser, but still
significant, associations between the location of the attorneys for the
reporting firm and the choice of law and forum.
The analogy between contractual choice of law and choice of
forum and incorporation suggests theoretical reasons to suppose that
Delaware might be chosen preferentially to other states in the merger
context. For example, Delaware judges are reputed to have expertise
in corporate matters and to be highly capable jurists. Although the
issues governed by choice of law and choice of forum clauses go to
questions of contract interpretation rather than internal corporate
affairs, it is reasonable to suppose that the contract issues in merger
agreements will be at least closely interwoven with questions
commonly adjudicated by the Delaware courts. Because disputes in
merger contracts often will be resolved through equitable relief (for
example, a motion for a preliminary injunction), it is also reasonable
to assume that the Delaware Chancery Court, which is the court of
first instance for corporate cases, will also be the forum for
adjudication of most disputes over the contracts in our data set. Thus,
the perceived advantages of Delaware law and forum in corporate
cases may carry over to the context of choice of law and forum in
merger contracts.
We find strong evidence that Delaware is, in fact, preferred to
other states as a provider of law and forum in our data, but that
preference is largely related to Delaware being the state of
incorporation. We also find evidence that the preference for Delaware
incorporation is greater than the preference for Delaware law or forum
for resolving contractual disputes. Companies were more likely to
incorporate in Delaware than they were to select Delaware as the
provider of law or forum. To the degree there is a flight from Delaware
in this respect, the beneficiaries appear to be New York and
California, which are preferred as providers of law and forum
compared with states other than Delaware, holding other factors
constant. The outflow from Delaware is not trivial. Delaware was the
place of incorporation for 189 merger contracts; it was the choice of
law for 132. With respect to forum selection, 115 contracts that
designated a forum had Delaware corporate acquirers. Yet only sixty-
four contracts specified Delaware as the litigation forum. In contrast,
New York had eight corporate acquirers and seventy contracts
1982 [Vol. 59:6:1975
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selecting New York law and forty-five selecting New York as the
litigation forum.
Further exploring the analogy between choice of law/choice of
forum and incorporation, we inquired whether Delaware law or forum
would be preferentially chosen by the parties when the acquired firm
was publicly held. The reason for this inquiry is that in such a
situation, the fiduciary duties of the acquired firm's directors may
become salient issues, and Delaware courts can be posited to be
experts in adjudicating matters pertaining to directors' fiduciary
duties. 35 We found that the public nature of the acquired firm had a
significant positive association with Delaware law being chosen and
with Delaware as the choice of forum. We also investigated whether
the choice of law or choice of forum decisions might be related to the
location of the attorney. Other things equal, we might expect
attorneys to opt for the law and/or forum where they are licensed to
practice. We do find a significant association between the acquirer's
attorney's location and the contractual choice of law and forum.
However, attorneys also often specified a law and/or forum in a state
other than that where they were listed as doing business.3 6 We also
find evidence that attorneys in New York are significantly more likely
to specify a forum than are attorneys located in other states.
This Article is structured as follows. Part II describes the data
analyzed. Part III describes the basic patterns of incorporation,
business and attorney location, and choice of law and forum. Part IV
explores the choice of law in merger contracts and Part V explores the
choice of forum. Part VI reports on the decision whether to designate a
litigation forum in merger contracts. Part VII concludes.
II. THE DATA SET
The data consisted of merger agreements contained as exhibits
to Form 8K "current report" filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission for the seven-month period from January 1 to July 31,
2002. Form 8K must be filed by SEC reporting firms to disclose
certain material corporate events or changes that have not been
previously reported by the company. 37 One important such event is a
35. We thank Marcel Kahan and John Coates for independently suggesting this inquiry.
36. It may be that attorneys in these cases practiced in firms that also had offices in the
selected forum, but our data did not permit us to investigate this question.
37. For the current rules, see Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 8-K,
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf (last visited January 4, 2006).
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merger agreement. 38 We searched Form 8K filings containing exhibits
with this type of contract. 39 We analyzed each such contract to
determine whether it could be categorized as a merger, including
major asset acquisitions and stock transactions.
There are cogent theoretical reasons for examining this data
set. By definition, the merger agreements in the data set form part of
transactions deemed material (i.e., important) by the reporting firm.
Because the contracts are important to the reporting firm's operations,
we can assume that they receive some degree of care and attention
during the negotiation and drafting phase, either from the reporting
firm's employees or from outside counsel, or both. Because we are
examining contracts that are written before disputes arise, moreover,
we can be reasonably confident that in most cases the contracting
parties did not anticipate the nature of any dispute that might arise,
and therefore would not know whether a particular term would help
or hurt them in the event of a conflict. These characteristics support
the hypothesis that, within some range of error, the contract terms
that we observe may represent reasonably efficient allocations of
rights and duties among the parties. In this Article, we are concerned
with two choices in particular made by the contracting parties: the law
picked to govern in the event of a dispute over the contract and the
forum selected for the adjudication or resolution of such a dispute.
Since much of this study explores whether corporations are
attracted to, or shy away from, Delaware law or courts, merger
agreements have another appealing feature. Corporate law and
corporate governance law are particular strengths of Delaware. If
Delaware law or courts are to attract contractual provisions or
litigation, one might expect Delaware to be most attractive in
contracts such as merger agreements. As such, we expect a study of
merger contracts to yield results that are conservative in the sense
that this is an area which should show Delaware in its most favorable
contractual setting.40
38. Reporting firms entering merger agreements routinely file Form 8Ks disclosing the
essential terms of the proposed transaction. Exhibits to Form 8K are classified by type of
contract. Among the types of contract that must be filed as Exhibits are "Any material plan[s] of
acquisition, disposition, reorganization, readjustment, succession, liquidation or
arrangement .. " 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(2) (2006).
39. The filings typically include the merger agreement itself as an exhibit to the filing.
These merger agreements, which are available on-line via both the SEC and LEXIS, thus provide
an excellent source of information about the contractual choices made by parties engaged in
business consolidations.
40. We fully agree with comments we have received indicating that results would be
enhanced by branching out to other forms of contract. The short answer is that we have
preliminarily coded choice of law provisions in a total of over 2800 contracts available from Form
8K SEC filings in 2002. Compared to all other substantial areas of contract, Delaware in fact
1984 [Vol. 59:6:1975
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III. PLACES OF INCORPORATION, BUSINESS AND ATTORNEY LOCALE,
AND CHOICE OF LAW AND FORUM
This Part describes the basic patterns of incorporation,
business and attorney locale, and choices of law and forum.
Table 1 shows the distributions, by state, of key attributes that
might be expected to be associated with patterns of choice of law and
forum. These include the acquirer's places of business and
incorporation, the acquired firm's place of incorporation, and the
acquirer's attorney's place of business.
Table 1 confirms Delaware's dominance as the place of
incorporation for publicly held firms. The "Acquirer place of
incorporation" column shows that Delaware is the acquirer's state of
incorporation for 189 of 412 agreements (45.9 percent). Other than
Delaware, only Nevada achieves larger than a five percent share of
the acquirer-incorporation market.
Large and commercially prominent states, California, New
York, and Texas, have miniscule shares of the incorporation market
but substantial or nontrivial shares of the "Acquirer place of business"
(the table's first two numerical columns) listings. Delaware's
attraction is not a function of where companies do substantial
business. As the first two columns show, Delaware is the "Acquirer
place of business" for only 1.2 percent of firms. Here, California and
New York are more dominant, with Texas third.
does attract the most choice of law and forum selection provisions in merger agreements. We
thus believe our results are conservative in the sense just described.
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Table 1. Distribution by Locale of Acquiring Firm's Place of
Business and Incorporation, Acquired Firm's Place of
Incorporation, Attorney's Place of Business
Acquirer place Acquirer place Acquired place of Acquirer's
of business of incorporation
AZ
CA
Canada
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
IL
MA
MD
NC
NH
NJ
NV
NY
OH
OR
Other
PA
TX
United
Kingdom
UT
VA
WA
Unknown
Total
N %
9 2.18
93 22.57
13 3.16
9 2.18
7 1.70
2 0.49
5 1.21
19 4.61
11 2.67
14 3.40
15 3.64
11 2.67
4 0.97
5 1.21
12 2.91
9 2.18
45 10.92
8 1.94
4 0.97
53 12.86
16 3.88
23 5.58
0 0.00
11 2.67
7 1.70
7 1.70
0 0.00
412 100.00
incorporation
0.00
4.85
0.97
2.91
0.00
0.00
45.87
3.64
1.21
0.73
0.73
1.46
1.73
0.24
0.97
12.86
1.94
1.21
1.21
10.19
2.91
1.21
0.24
1.46
1.21
1.21
0.00
100.00
0.49 8
1.94 4
0.97 7
0.00 70
100.00 412
1.94
0.97
1.70
16.99
100.00
1986
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, mergers, Jan. 2002 to July 2002.
Note. All states with at least five mergers satisfying any one of the four column criteria are
reported individually. States without at least five mergers satisfying at least one of the column
criteria are coded as "Other". Except for the attorney's place of business, unknown places are
coded as "Other". Unknown places are trivially few except for attorney's place of business.
0.73
8.50
2.67
1.94
0.00
0.00
40.78
3.16
2.43
0.73
1.46
1.70
0.24
0.97
1.94
5.34
2.43
0.97
0.97
13.59
1.94
2.43
1.70
attorney's place
of business
N %
2 0.49
74 17.96
1 0.24
12 2.91
0 0.00
13 3.16
0 0.00
10 2.43
15 3.64
18 4.37
17 4.13
5 1.21
2 0.73
0 0
5 1.21
3 0.73
67 16.26
5 1.21
3 0.73
38 9.22
16 3.88
15 3.64
1 0.24
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The fifth and sixth numerical columns show that Delaware is
the dominant place of incorporation for acquired firms as well as for
acquiring firms. It is the acquired company's state of incorporation for
168 of 412 agreements (40.8 percent). The pattern across states of the
acquirer's attorney's place of business, though often not indicated in
the EDGAR filings searched (seventeen percent "Unknown"), more
closely resembles the place-of-business pattern than the incorporation
pattern.
Table 2 shows that Delaware's dominance continues for
variables of interest here. It shows that Delaware accounts for 32.0
percent of the governing law clauses, with New York a distant second
and California ranking third. Delaware also leads as a litigation forum
choice, as shown in Table 2's third and fourth numerical columns.
Table 2. Distribution by Locale of Governing Law Chosen &
Litigation Forum Specified in Merger Contracts
Governing law chosen Litigation forum specified
N % N %
CA 50 12.14 32 7.77
Canada 6 1.46 3 0.73
CO 9 2.18 6 1.46
DE 132 32.04 64 15.53
FL 19 4.61 9 2.18
GA 6 1.46 3 0.73
MA 6 1.46 5 1.21
MD 8 1.94 5 1.21
NJ 7 1.70 4 0.97
NV 27 6.55 7 1.70
NY 70 16.99 45 10.92
OH 5 1.21 2 0.49
Other 48 11.65 27 6.55
PA 10 2.43 1 0.24
TX 9 2.18 2 0.49
None or not applicable 0 0.00 196 47.57
Any - - 1 0.24
Total 412 100.00 412 100.00
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, mergers, Jan. 2002 to July 2002.
Note. All states with at least five mergers satisfying either of the column criteria are reported
individually. States without at least five mergers satisfying at least one of the column criteria
are coded as "Other". Contracts that list both New York and Delaware law, usually phrased as
New York law applies except where Delaware law applies, are listed as choosing New York law.
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Although Delaware leads as a place of incorporation and a
forum for purposes of choice of law and litigation, it is the relation
among the three that is of principal interest to us. If Delaware's
efficient and skilled judges and procedures are part of the positive
attraction of Delaware as a place of incorporation, as some claim, one
expects Delaware to attract choice of law clauses disproportionately
relative to other states. However, once one accounts for Delaware as
the place of incorporation, firms tend to flee Delaware as a choice of
law and forum. Tables 1 and 2 suggest as much. Delaware provides for
45.9 percent of acquirers' places of incorporation but only 32.0 percent
of choice of law provisions. Table 2 shows that when contracts specify
a litigation forum, Delaware also suffers a net outflow compared to its
dominance as a place of incorporation.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS: EXPLORING THE CHOICE OF LAW PATTERN:
ARE DELAWARE COURTS AND JUDGES ATTRACTING GOVERNING LAW
CLAUSES?
Simple bivariate analysis suggests that, after accounting for
the decision of where to incorporate, merging firms tend to reject
Delaware as a choice of law. We use the acquiring firm's state of
incorporation and locale, the attorney's locale, and the relation of
these variables to choice of law to suggest a flight from Delaware on
choice of law matters. Regression analysis, in which we
simultaneously account for variables considered individually in the
bivariate analysis, is consistent with the simpler analyses.
A. Choice of Law Bivariate Analysis
To explore the pattern of flight from Delaware, we examine in
more detail the relation between incorporation/location characteristics
and choice of law. Table 3 simplifies the earlier tables by focusing
solely on choice of law and by reducing the geographical units to
Delaware, New York, California, and Other. All places of
incorporation or choices of law other than Delaware, New York, and
California are coded as "Other."
Table 3A shows first that a strong association exists between
state of incorporation of the acquiring firm and choice of law. The
boldface diagonal percentages show that, across the four major locales
in the table, at least fifty-three percent of the choices of law are the
same as the place of incorporation. New York and California acquirers
show a strong affinity for choosing their incorporation state's laws,
with both choosing such laws about 80 percent of the time. Delaware
1988 [Vol. 59:6:1975
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shows the weakest association between incorporation state and choice
of law. 41 The positive association between choice of law and place of
incorporation is highly statistically significant (p<.001).42
Table 3A also shows that choice of law provisions tend to flow
"away" from Delaware and Other and towards New York and
California. Delaware acquirers account for 181 incorporations, as
Table 3's first row shows, but only 135 choices of law, as the table's
first numerical column shows. Similarly, the residual Other category
has 198 incorporations but only 155 choices of law. New York, in
contrast, shows an increase in choices of law relative to
incorporations. It has only six incorporations but sixty-three choices of
law. Similarly, California increases from twenty incorporations to
fifty-two choices of law.
Table 3A. Acquirer Firm State of Incorporation and
Choice of Law
Acquirer state of
incorporation
Choice of Law
DE NY CA Other Total
DE (N) 96 37 20 28 181
Percent 53.04 20.44 11.05 15.47 100.00
NY (N) 1 5 0 0 6
Percent 16.67 83.33 0.00 0.00 100.00
CA (N) 3 0 15 2 20
Percent 15.00 0.00 75.00 10.00 100.00
Other (N) 35 21 17 125 198
Percent 17.68 10.61 8.59 63.13 100.00
Total (N) 135 63 52 155 405
Percent 33.33 11.56 12.84 38.27 100.00
41. These results are consistent with Florencia Marotta-Wurgler's study of 597 end-user
software license agreements between software vendors and purchasers. Marotta-Wurgler found
that Delaware law was chosen in less than 2% of the contracts that specified a governing law,
even though 21% of the contracting firms were incorporated in Delaware. The major flight from
Delaware in her study is to California: 45 of the contracts involving Delaware-incorporated
vendors selected California law, far more than any other state. California law was chosen in 27%
of the contracts that specified a governing law, even though only 17% of the firms in her sample
were incorporated in California. Interview with Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Assistant Professor
of Law, New York University, in N.Y., N.Y. (Aug. 23, 2006).
42. This and similar bivariate significance levels reported in several tables below are based
on simple multinomial logit models in which the four choice of law outcomes are modeled as a
function of dummy variables representing the states of incorporation.
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Table 3B reports the results for the relation between choice of
law and the acquired firm's place of incorporation. It shows a positive
relation similar to that of acquiring firms, and the relation is also
highly statistically significant.
Table 3B. Acquired Firm State of Incorporation and
Choice of Law
Choice of law
Acquired firm's state
of incorporation
DE NY CA Other Total
DE (N) 89 28 10 30 157
Percent 56.89 17.83 6.37 19.11 100.00
NY (N) 0 2 0 0 2
Percent 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
CA (N) 0 0 9 0 9
Percent 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00
Other (N) 43 31 29 123 226
Percent 19.03 13.72 12.83 54.42 100.00
Total (N) 132 61 48 153 394
Percent 33.50 15.48 12.18 38.83 100.00
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, mergers, Jan. 2002 to July 2002.
Note. All states other than Delaware, New York, and California are coded as "Other." Excludes
seven mergers that designate both Delaware and New York law.
One expects not only the place of incorporation but also the
place of business to be associated with the choice of law. Table 4A,
which reports on acquiring firms, explores that relation and also
allows study of the flow of cases with place of business, rather than
place of incorporation as a baseline. Again, the emboldened diagonal
entries suggest a strong association between place of business and
choice of law. For each place-of-business state, the greatest choice of
law percent is in that state. Table 4A also shows flow from California
and Other as places of business to New York and Delaware as choices
of law. New York is the place of business for forty-two firms but the
choice of law for sixty-three firms. The enormous flow towards
Delaware-five places of business and 135 choices of law-is
presumably a consequence of its prominence as a state of
incorporation and the association between state of incorporation and
choice of law. Table 4B shows that the relation between place of
business and choice of law for acquired firms is quite similar to that
for acquiring firms. The positive association between place of business
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and choice of law in both tables is highly statistically significant
(p<.O01).
Table 4A. Acquirer Firm Place of Business and
Choice of Law
Acquirer place
of business
DE (N)
Percent
NY (N)
Percent
CA (N)
Percent
Other (N)
Percent
Total (N)
Percent
Choice of law
DE NY CA Other Total
4
80.00
10
23.81
33
35.48
88
33.46
135
33.50
0
0.00
25
59.52
4
4.30
34
12.93
63
15.63
0
0.00
1
2.38
40
43.01
11
4.18
52
12.90
1
20.00
6
14.29
16
17.20
130
49.43
153
37.97
5
100.00
42
100.00
93
100.00
263
100.00
403
100.00
Table 4B. Acquired Firm Place
Choice of Law
Acquired place
of business
DE (N)
Percent
NY (N)
Percent
CA (N)
Percent
Other (N)
Percent
Total (N)
Percent
of Business and
Choice of law
DE NY CA Other Total
3
75.00
5
14.71
37
43.53
89
32.13
134
33.50
0
0.00
20
58.82
7
8.24
36
13.00
63
15.75
0
0.00
2
5.88
29
34.12
19
6.86
50
12.50
1
25.00
7
20.59
12
14.12
133
48.01
153
38.25
4
100.00
34
100.00
85
100.00
277
100.00
400
100.00
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, mergers, Jan. 2002 to July 2002.
Note. All states other than Delaware, New York, and California are coded as "Other." Excludes
seven mergers that designate both Delaware and New York law.
One expects that attorneys are another key influence on choice
of law. Attorneys are likely to specify the law of a state with which
they are familiar. They are likely to be most familiar with the law of
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the jurisdiction in which they are located. We thus expect New York
attorneys to tend to specify New York law in their contracts,
California attorneys to specify California law, and so on. Given that
corporate attorneys can also be expected to be generally familiar with
Delaware law, we expect that Delaware law also will be selected on a
relatively frequent basis.
Table 5 shows the relation between the attorney's address and
choice of law. The dominant laws specified are, as above, Delaware
and Other. The place of incorporation likely is driving their
dominance. The bold diagonal- percentages indicate, as expected, a
reasonably strong association between attorney locale and choice of
law. (Note that Delaware is not the attorney place of business for any
firm in our sample.) Only Delaware successfully competes with
attorney locale. The positive association between choice of law and
attorney place of business is highly statistically significant (p<.001).
Table 5. Attorney Place of Business and Choice of Law
Attorney place of
business
NY (N)
Percent
CA (N)
Percent
Other (N)
Percent
Choice of law
DE NY CA Other Total
25 28 2 8 63
39.68 44.44 3.17 12.70 100.00
31 3 28 10 72
43.06 4.17 38.89 13.89 100.00
79 32 22 137 270
29.26 11.85 8.15 50.74 100.00
Total (N) 135 63 52 155 405
Percent 33.33 15.56 12.84 38.27 100.00
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, mergers, Jan. 2002 to July 2002.
Note. All states other than Delaware, New York, and California are coded as "Other," as are
contracts with unknown attorney place of business. Excludes seven mergers that designate both
Delaware and New York law.
The results so far suggest that Delaware dominates as the
choice of law but that, after accounting for place of incorporation,
choices of law flow away from Delaware and towards New York and
California. The possibility remains that movement of choice of law
towards New York and California is a consequence of those states'
relatively strong showings as places of business or attorney locales. To
assess whether these factors fully account for the flow away from
Delaware, we limit the sample in two ways. First, we exclude all
mergers in which New York is the place of business or the attorney
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locale. Second, we exclude all mergers in which California is the place
of business or the attorney locale.
Table 6, panel A, shows the results with the New York
exclusions. After the exclusions, no cases remain in which New York is
the state of incorporation of the acquiring firm. Nevertheless, New
York is the choice of law in twenty-four mergers. Choice of law flows to
New York from both Delaware corporations and from corporations
other than our three principal states. Panel B shows that, after
excluding California businesses and attorneys, California law is the
choice of law in eight mergers. Both New York and California show an
inflow, but New York's is more substantial. The associations between
state of incorporation and choice of law in both panels is highly
statistically significant (p<.001).
Table 6. State of Incorporation and Choice of Law,
Excluding New York and California Firms Either Located in
Those States or with Attorneys in Those States
Choice of law
A. Excluding firms with place of business or attorneys located in NY
Acquirer's state DE NY CA Other Total
of incorporation
DE (N) 78
Percent 60.00
CA (N) 1
Percent 5.56
Other (N) 26
Percent 15.20
Total (N) 105
Percent 32.92
B. Excluding firms
DE (N)
Percent
NY (N)
Percent
CA (N)
Percent
Other (N)
Percent
Total (N)
Percent
11
8.46
0
0.00
13
7.60
24
7.52
19 22
14.62 16.92
15 2
83.33 11.11
15 117
8.77 68.42
49 141
15.36 44.20
130
100.00
18
100.00
171
100.00
319
100.00
with place of business or attorneys located in Calif.
59 33 1 22 115
51.30 28.70 0.87 19.13 100.00
1 4 0 0 5
20.00 80.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
1 0 2 0 3
33.33 0.00 66.67 0.00 100.00
30 20 5 110 165
18.18 12.12 3.03 66.67 100.00
91 57 8 132 288
31.60 19.79 2.78 45.83 100.00
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, mergers, Jan. 2002 to July 2002.
Note. All states other than Delaware, New York, and California are coded as "Other." Excludes
seven mergers that designate both Delaware and New York law.
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New York's inflow of mergers choosing its law does not appear
to be attributable to a particular industry. We have identified the two-
digit SIC codes for thirteen of the twenty-four New York choice of law
firms. No industry is represented more than twice. Nor is the inflow a
function of the particular form of corporate combination, such as stock
deal in contrast to asset acquisition.
B. Choice of Law Regression Analysis
Regression analysis allows us to explore simultaneously the
effect of the previously discussed variables--choice of law, state of
incorporation, business locale, and attorney location--on law and
forum choices. Preliminarily, we note some likely limitations on what
regression models might accomplish with respect to both choice of law
and choice of forum. The previous tables establish that several
factors-places of incorporation and business, as well as attorney
locale-are positively associated with choice of law. These factors are
unlikely to be independent of one another. In reasonable regression
models, the variables explaining choice of law (and, as shown below,
choice of forum) thus depend on one another. These interdependencies
suggest using systems of equations to model choice of law and its
related factors.43 Unfortunately, statistical methodology has made
only modest progress in solving complex systems of equations
involving categorical data.44 Fully modeling all or even most of the
dependencies that may exist in the models reported is likely not
feasible given the limited available data and the state of statistical
methodology. Nevertheless, the simple descriptive story suggested by
the bivariate tables throughout this article is reasonably consistent
with the regression models we report. So, while we acknowledge the
formal limitations of the models we use, a reasonable interpretation of
the totality of results reported supports our conclusions.
One basic question is what factors lead a corporation to specify
Delaware law or Delaware as a litigation forum. In light of the
43. The models explored thus likely raise issues of endogeneity. Endogenous variables are
variables influenced by other variables in the system being studied. For example, abandoning
the choice of law in forum selection appears, according to model (3) in Table 16 below, to be a
function of the chosen law (in particular Delaware law). But the selection of Delaware law is
itself likely a function of other factors such as state of incorporation (for example, Delaware
corporations tend to choose Delaware law) and other factors. The presence of endogeneity with
respect to multiple variables raises questions of model validity. These questions are not
necessarily resolved by combining endogenous and exogenous variables in a single equation or
even by two-equation systems such as bivariate probit models.
44. Theodore Eisenberg, Empirical Methods and the Law, in STATISTICS IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 179, 186 (Adrian E. Raftery, Martin A. Tanner & Martin T. Wells eds., 2002).
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hypothesis that the public or private status of acquired firms should
be associated with whether Delaware law is chosen, we add variables
for public status to explore these factors. It is appropriate also to ask
what factors move firms to migrate away from Delaware as a choice of
law. The hypothesis that merging firms migrate away from Delaware
suggests that incorporation in Delaware should be associated with
choosing governing law other than Delaware's more than being
incorporated in another state is associated with choosing governing
law other than that state's. That is, Delaware corporations, more than
other corporations, will tend to flee their state of incorporation when
selecting governing law.
To assess the effect of corporate public status, we define two
dummy variables, "Acquirer public" and "Acquired public." "Acquirer
public" equals one when the acquiring firm is public and equals zero
otherwise. "Acquired public" equals one when the acquired firm is
public and equals zero otherwise. Table 7 summarizes these variables
and their relation to whether Delaware law or forum is chosen. Public
acquiring firms select Delaware law at a higher rate (34.9 percent)
than private acquiring firms (18.9 percent). The difference is
marginally statistically significant (p=.066). Delaware law is chosen
significantly (p<.001) more often in the case of public acquired firms
(46.6 percent) than in the case of private acquired firms (23.1 percent).
This confirms the Kahan-Coates hypothesis that Delaware law would
be especially attractive when public firms are acquired. 45 With respect
to choice of forum (for those contracts designating a forum), no
acquirer effect emerges (p=.999). But the acquired firm's public status
is strongly associated with Delaware being the chosen forum (p<.001).
These variables will be added to our models of choice of law and choice
of forum explored below.
45. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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Table 7. Public Status and Choice of Forum and Law
Choice of forum Choice of law
Delaware Delaware Total Delaware Delaware Total
forum forum not law law not
chosen chosen chosen chosen
Acquirer public (N) 61 139 200 128 239 367
Percent 30.50 69.50 100.00 34.88 65.12 100.00
Acquirer private (N) 3 9 12 7 30 37
Percent 25.00 75.00 100.00 18.92 81.08 100.00
Total 64 148 212 135 269 404
Percent 30.19 69.81 100.00 33.42 66.58 100.00
Acquired public (N) 45 43 88 82 94 176
Percent 51.14 48.86 100.00 46.59 53.41 100.00
Acquired private (N) 19 105 124 53 176 229
Percent 15.32 84.68 100.00 23.14 76.86 100.00
Total 64 148 212 135 270 405
Percent 30.19 69.81 100.00 33.33 66.67 100.00
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, mergers, Jan. 2002 to July 2002.
Note. Excludes seven mergers that designate both Delaware and New York law.
In addition to defining a simple dummy variable equal to one
when Delaware law is chosen and zero otherwise, we define a variable,
"choice of law other than state of incorporation" (the "flight" variable),
that equals one when the acquiring firm's state of incorporation and
choice of law do not match. It equals zero when they do match. The
hope is to see if Delaware as a place of acquirer incorporation is
positively or negatively associated with the flight variable. Table 8
summarizes this variable. It shows that Delaware acquiring
corporations tend to reject Delaware law more than other corporations
tend to reject their states' laws. Forty-seven percent of 181 Delaware
acquirers rejected Delaware law. Other acquirers rejected their states'
laws less than thirty-five percent of the time. The difference across the
four state-of-incorporation categories is marginally statistically
significant (p=.056, using Fisher's exact test) and the forty-seven
percent rate of flight from Delaware law is substantially higher than
those of New York and California.
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Table 8. Choice of Law Other than State of Incorporation
Acquirer's state Choice of law = state of Choice of law * state of Total
of incorporation
DE (N)
Percent
incorporation incorporation
96 85 181
53.04 46.96 100.00
NY(N) 5 1 6
Percent 83.33 16.67 100.00
CA (N) 15 5 20
Percent 75.00 25.00 100.00
Other (N) 125 73 198
Percent 63.13 36.87 100.00
Total (N) 241 164 405
Percent 59.51 40.49 100.00
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, mergers, Jan. 2002 to July 2002.
Note. All states other than Delaware, New York, and California are coded as "Other." Excludes
seven mergers that designate both Delaware and New York law.
New York as an attorney locale, as an acquiring company's
place of business, or as an acquired company's place of business may
attract New York as a choice of law. To examine whether these
features account for the flight from Delaware law, we report in the
Appendix a version of Table 8 that excludes cases with New York
attorneys or places of business. 46 Delaware corporations then choose
non-Delaware law in approximately forty-one percent of mergers, the
sample as a whole chooses law other than the state of incorporation in
approximately thirty-four percent of mergers (analogous to Table 8's
total row). The differences in the table are statistically significant
(p=0.050). If one excludes mergers with California attorney or place-of-
business connections as well as mergers with these New York
connections, the result is more statistically significant (p=.010).
Table 8's summary of nonconcordance between state of
incorporation and choice of law shows promising results. We now seek
to model nonconcordance by accounting for multiple factors described
individually in earlier tables. Table 9 reports logistic regression
results for two dependent variables. The first, assessed in models (1)
and (2), is equal to one if Delaware law is specified and equal to zero
otherwise. The second dependent variable, assessed in models (3) and
(4), is the flight variable. Since both dependent variables are
dichotomous, logistic regression is appropriate. 47 The models include
46. See infra app. tbl.A-1.
47. Some combinations of variables have low frequencies. We therefore use bootstrap
methods to compute the standard errors in the logistic regressions. See generally BRADLEY
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dummy variables for public-private corporate status, place of
incorporation, corporate locale, and attorney locale. Model (1) includes
the full sample. Model (2) excludes mergers in which acquiring firms
or their attorneys are located in New York. All models report adjusted
standard errors to account for clustering by two-digit Standard
Industrial Classification code.48
In model (1), the coefficients on the New York, California, and
Other incorporation variables are all negative relative to the Delaware
corporation reference category and the coefficient for Other is
statistically significant. The coefficients for New York and California
are larger than the coefficient for Other. Their lack of statistical
significance may be a consequence of the relatively few firms in the
sample that incorporated in those states. The negative signs suggest
that selecting Delaware law is negatively associated with being a non-
Delaware corporation, as suggested by the bivariate results in Table 8.
The positive, significant associations on the public status variables
indicate that Delaware law is preferred by public acquiring and
acquired firms compared to private firms. The coefficients on the
acquirer's business locale variables are all negative and large. A test
of the hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero yields p=.004,
suggesting that business locale other than Delaware is negatively
associated with Delaware as a choice of law. Model (2) yields results
consistent with model (1) in the subsample that excludes New York
businesses and attorneys.
Models (3), (4), and (5) assess whether Delaware corporations
are more likely to flee their state of incorporation's laws than are
other corporations. Model (3)'s substantial size and negative sign for
New York and California acquirer coefficients indicates that such
firms are less likely to reject their incorporating state's laws. But the
two coefficients are not statistically significant, either singly or jointly.
Model (4) removes the three insignificant place-of-business variables
and the insignificant "Acquiring firm public" variable. This simplified
model shows a significant tendency of non-Delaware corporations to
choose their incorporation states' laws more than Delaware
corporations do. The coefficients on all three place-of-incorporation
variables are negative, the New York variable is statistically
significant, and the Other variable is marginally statistically
EFRON & ROBERT J. TIBSHIRANI, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE BOOTSTRAP (CRC Press 1998) (1993)
(discussing the method of the bootstrap for assessing statistical accuracy).
48. We located SIC codes for 63 percent of the contracts. The remaining contracts were
grouped together in a single category. The results in Table 9 do not materially differ using
unclustered models. The sensitivity of the two models in Table 16 is described in the text note
under that table.
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significant. In model (5)'s reduced sample, which excludes New York
businesses and attorneys, the coefficients on the California and Other
incorporation variables (no New York acquiring corporations are in
the sample) are negative. Thus, the reduced sample provides modest
additional support for the flight from Delaware law.
In models not reported here, the acquired firm's place of
business being in New York was significantly negatively associated
with Delaware as a choice of law and significantly positively
associated with flight from the acquirer's place of incorporation.
Models that accounted for the nature of the corporate combination,
through inclusion of a dummy variable for whether the transaction
was described as an "acquisition," rather than as a merger or share
exchange, did not yield results materially different from those
reported in Table 9.
C. Conflict of Laws Considerations
Aspects of Delaware law may govern even if a contract specifies
another state's law. A New York choice of law provision in a merger
contract involving a Delaware corporation does not necessarily mean
that New York law governs all aspects of the merger contract. In
general, under New York choice of law rules, New York's courts will
apply Delaware substantive law to merger-related matters of internal
corporate governance even in the presence of a contractual New York
choice of law provision. "Under New York law, the law of the
incorporating state has traditionally been applied to the internal
affairs of a foreign corporation."49 Thus, for example, assertions of
unfair treatment by dissenting shareholders of foreign corporations
likely would not be governed by New York law even in New York
courts. 50
49. BBS Norwalk One, Inc. v. Raccolta, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 123, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd,
205 F.3d 1321 (2d Cir. 1999); Hart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 517 N.Y.S.2d 490, 492 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987) ("One of the abiding principles of the law of corporations is that the issue of corporate
governance ... is governed by the law of the state in which the corporation is chartered."); Sokol
v. Ventures Educ. Sys. Corp., No. 602856-02, 2005 WL 3249447, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 27,
2005) (citing Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 668 N.E.2d 1370 (N.Y. 1996)).
50. Globalvest Mgmt. Co. L.P. v. Citibank, N.A., No. 603386-04, 2005 WL 1148687, at *8
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 12, 2005) ("[Clomplaints arising out of alleged unfair treatment of dissenting
stockholders in a merger or consolidation of foreign corporations have traditionally been held to
be matters that should not be entertained in the courts of this state." (quoting Mantei v. Creole
Petroleum Corp., 402 N.Y.S.2d 822, 823 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978))).
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Table 9. Logistic Regression Models of
Choice of Law Being Delaware and
Being Other than Acquirer's State of Incorporation
Dependent variables
Acquired firm public
Acquirer public
Acquirer inc. in NY
Acquirer inc. in CA
Acquirer inc. in Other
Attorney bus. in CA
Attorney bus. In
Other
Acquirer bus. in NY
Acquirer bus. in CA
Acquirer bus. in Other
Constant
Observations
(1)
Dela.
law
chosen
1.405**
(5.17)
1.229+
(1.70)
-2.518
(0.36)
-2.330
(0.79)
-1.919**
(7.18)
-0.026
(0.06)
-0.475
(1.56)
-3.820
(0.25)
-2.685
(0.18)
-2.221
(0.15)
1.250
(0.09)
402
(2)
Dela. law
chosen,
exclude
NY
contracts
1.483**
(3.69)
1.570*
(2.07)
-3.731
(0.52)
-2.276**
(7.52)
0.210
(0.23)
-2.134
(0.14)
-1.686
(0.11)
0.118
(0.01)
316
(3)
Law chosen *
state of
incorporation
-0.276
(0.88)
-0.073
(0.17)
-2.776
(0.33)
-1.099
(1.37)
-0.011
(0.06)
-0.630+
(1.68)
-0.664**
(2.64)
-1.006
(0.06)
-2.442
(0.14)
-3.111
(0.19)
3.152
(0.19)
402
(4)
Law chosen #
state of
incorporation
-0.193
(0.64)
-2.126*
(2.35)
-0.939
(1.33)
-0.313+
(1.66)
-0.723+
(1.83)
-0.967**
(4.10)
0.688*
(2.07)
405
(5)
Law chosen
i state of
inc., exclude
NY
contracts
-0.215
(0.69)
0.062
(0.10)
-1.256
(1.29)
-0.287
(1.06)
-0.354
(0.92)
-0.142
(0.22)
316
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, mergers, Jan. 2002 to July 2002.
Note. All states other than Delaware, New York, and California are coded as "Other." Excludes
seven mergers that designate both Delaware and New York law. Reference category for place of
incorporation is Delaware. Reference category for attorney place of business is New York in
models (1), (3) and (4), Other in model (2), and California in model (5). Reference category for
place of business is Delaware in models (1), (2), and (3). Models (2), (4), and (5) exclude mergers
with contracts indicating that New York is the acquirer's place of business or the attorney's place
of business. Models account for clustering on two-digit Standard Industrial Classification codes.
Bootstrap-based z statistics are in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; **
significant at 1%
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If a contract specifies New York law, and New York choice of
law rules mandate applying Delaware law, it is nevertheless
reasonable to view contractual choice of New York law as evidence of
flight from Delaware law or attraction to New York law. For several
reasons, the choice of New York law remains an important decision
should litigation occur. First, the choice reflects an overall preference
for New York law over that of Delaware on many subjects. When a
New York forum is chosen, New York law will govern procedural
issues, 51 and can govern issues unrelated to internal corporate
governance. 52 Second, when contacts with New York are sufficiently
strong compared to contacts with Delaware, New York law may even
govern substantive matters touching on corporate governance. 53
Merely designating New York law in the contract introduces the
possibility of plausibly arguing in litigation that New York law should
govern on one or more issues. Third, for many of the contractual
provisions studied here, the contract indicates that New York law
should apply without regard to conflict-of-law rules.
Thus, consideration of conflict-of-law rules is necessary to
understand the detailed effect of specifying that a state's laws will
govern. But, even after accounting for conflict principles, the decision
to designate New York or another state's laws is a significant
endorsement of such laws and, in the case of a Delaware corporation, a
notable failure to embrace Delaware law.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS: EXPLORING THE CHOICE OF FORUM PATTERN
OF FLIGHT FROM DELAWARE
This Part explores the choice of forum clauses in the merger
contracts. It first reports the relations between forum choice and state
of incorporation, business locale, and attorney locale. It then shows
the relation between choice of forum and choice of law. Regression
results then confirm that Delaware corporations tend to opt for other
states' fora more than other corporations opt for non-incorporating
states' fora. For purposes of this analysis, we focus only on the state
51. Sokol, 2005 WL 3249447, at *5.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Greenspun v. Lindley, 352 N.Y.S.2d 633, 637 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), af'd, 330
N.E.2d 79 (N.Y. 1975) (indicating that "in certain unusual instances the law of the forum or of
another state having more significant contacts with the transactions might be applied in place of
the law of the state of incorporation"); Lewis v. Dicker, 459 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1982) ("The general rule in [New York] is the rule of 'center of gravity' or most significant
contacts."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971).
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selected as the forum and do not distinguish between federal and state
courts within a state. 54
A. Choice of Forum Bivariate Analysis
Table 10, analogous to Table 3, focuses on choice of forum by
again reducing the geographical units to Delaware, New York,
California, and Other. As before, all places of incorporation or choices
of law other than Delaware, New York, and California are coded as
Other.
Table 10A, which addresses the acquiring firm's state of
incorporation, shows that a strong association exists between state of
incorporation and choice of forum for litigation (conditional on a
litigation forum having been designated), though the association is a
bit weaker than the association for choice of law. The boldface
diagonal percents show that, across the four major locales in the table,
at least 40.9 percent of choices of forum are the same as the place of
incorporation. New York corporations, however few, show an affinity
for choosing New York courts. Delaware shows the weakest
association between incorporation state and choice of forum. Only
about forty-one percent of Delaware acquiring corporations specify
Delaware courts for litigation.
Table 10A also shows that the choice of litigation forum, like
the choice of law, tends to flow away from Delaware and Other and
towards New York and California. Delaware acquirers that specify a
litigation forum account for 115 incorporations but only sixty-four
forum choices. Similarly, the Other incorporation category has eighty-
eight incorporations but only seventy-six choices of forum. New York,
in contrast, shows an increase in choices of forum relative to
incorporations. Its four incorporations are accompanied by forty-five
choices of forum. Similarly, California increases from nine
incorporations to thirty-two choices of forum. Table 10B, which
addresses the acquired firm's state of incorporation, shows a pattern
similar to that of Table 10A. The positive association between state of
incorporation and choice of forum is highly statistically significant
(p<.001) in both tables.
54. Of the contracts that specified a forum, 23.4% specified a federal forum. New York
federal courts were specified in 31.1% of the contracts specifying New York as the forum. The
analogous figures for other jurisdictions were 29.7% for Delaware, 12.5% for California, and
18.2% for Other.
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Table 10A. Acquirer Firm State of Incorporation and
Choice of Forum
Acquirer state of
incorporation
DE (N)
Percent
NY (N)
Percent
CA (N)
Percent
Other (N)
Percent
Total (N)
Percent
Choice of forum
DE NY CA Other Total
47 27 17 24 115
40.87 23.48 14.78 20.87 100.00
0 4 0 0 4
0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
2 1 4 2 9
22.22 11.11 44.44 22.22 100.00
15 13 11 49 88
17.05 14.77 12.60 55.68 100.00
64 45 32 75 216
29.63 20.83 14.81 34.72 100.00
Table 10B. Acquired Firm State of Incorporation and
Choice of Forum
Acquired state of
incorporation
DE (N)
Percent
NY (N)
Percent
CA (N)
Percent
Other (N)
Percent
Total (N)
Percent
Choice of forum
DE NY CA Other Total
43 22 9 24 98
43.88 22.45 9.18 24.49 100.00
0 1 0 0 1
0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
0 1 1 0 2
0.00 50.00 50.00 0.00 100.00
20 20 20 49 109
18.35 18.35 18.35 44.95 100.00
63 44 30 73 210
30.00 20.95 14.29 34.76 100.00
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, mergers, Jan. 2002 to July 2002.
Note. All states other than Delaware, New York, and California are coded as "Other." Excludes
mergers that designate both Delaware and New York law. Excludes mergers that do not
designate a choice of forum.
Like the choice of law, one expects the business locale to be
associated with forum choice. Table 11A explores that relation for
acquiring firms. The diagonal entries again suggest a strong
association between place of business and choice of forum. For each
business locale, the largest choice of forum percent is that locale.
Table 1 lA also shows that acquirers with California and Other as
2006] 2003
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
places of business tend to flow away from their business locales and to
New York and Delaware as forum choices. New York is the place of
business for thirty-one firms but the forum choice for forty-five firms.
The flow towards Delaware-three business locales and sixty-four
forum choices-is, as in the case of inflow as a choice of law, likely a
consequence of its state-of-incorporation dominance. Table 1 1B, which
reports on acquired firms, shows a similar pattern. The positive
association between business locale and chosen forum is highly
statistically significant in both tables (p<.001).
Table 11A. Acquirer Firm Place of Business and
Choice of Forum
Choice of forum
Acquirer bus. DE NY CA Other Total
DE (N) 2 0 0 1 3
Percent 66.67 0.00 0.00 33.33 100.00
NY (N) 10 17 1 3 31
Percent 32.26 54.84 3.23 9.68 100.00
CA (N) 19 4 22 8 53
Percent 35.85 7.55 41.51 15.09 100.00
Other (N) 33 24 9 63 129
Percent 25.58 18.60 6.98 48.84 100.00
Total (N) 64 45 32 75 216
Percent 29.63 20.83 14.81 34.72 100.00
Table 11B. Acquired Firm Place of Business and
Choice of Forum
Acquired bus.
DE (N)
Percent
NY(N)
Percent
CA (N)
Percent
Other (N)
Percent
Total (N)
Percent
Choice of forum
DE NY CA Other Total
1 1 0 1 3
33.33 33.33 0.00 33.33 100.00
3 12 1 4 20
15.00 60.00 5.00 20.00 100.00
16 7 21 7 51
31.37 13.73 41.18 13.73 100.00
44 25 8 64 141
31.21 17.73 5.67 45.39 100.00
64 45 30 76 215
29.77 20.93 13.95 35.35 100.00
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, mergers, Jan. 2002 to July 2002.
Note. All states other than Delaware, New York, and California are coded as "Other." Excludes
mergers that designate both Delaware and New York law and mergers that do not designate a
choice of forum.
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As was also the case for choice of law, one expects attorneys to
influence merging parties' choice of forum. Familiarity with their
jurisdiction's courts is likely as important as familiarity with its law.
Table 12 shows the relation between the reporting company's
attorney's places of business and choice of forum. The chosen fora are
spread relatively evenly across the four fora but the association
between the attorney's place of business and selection of that locale as
the forum is statistically significant (p<.001). Delaware's 29.6 percent
exceeds the New York and California shares. The place of
incorporation again likely drives its prominence.
Table 12. Attorney Place of Business and
Choice of Forum
Attorney place
of business
Choice of forum
DE NY CA Other Total
NY (N) 17 22 2 8 49
Percent 34.69 44.90 4.08 16.33 100.00
CA (N) 17 3 17 6 43
Percent 39.53 6.98 39.53 13.95 100.00
Other (N) 30 20 13 61 124
Percent 24.19 16.13 10.48 49.19 100.00
Total (N) 64 45 32 76 216
Percent 29.63 20.83 14.81 34.72 100.00
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, mergers, Jan. 2002 to July 2002.
Note. All states other than Delaware, New York, and California are coded as "Other." Excludes
mergers that designate both Delaware and New York law. Excludes mergers that do not
designate a choice of forum.
As in the case of choice of law, Delaware numerically
dominates over New York and California as the choice of forum, but,
after accounting for place of incorporation, choices of forum flow away
from Delaware and towards New York and California. It again
remains possible that movement of choice of forum towards New York
and California is a consequence of places of business or attorney
locales. To assess whether these factors fully account for the flow away
from Delaware, we again limit the sample by (1) excluding all mergers
in which New York is the place of business or the attorney locale, and
(2) excluding all mergers in which California is the place of business
or the attorney locale.
Table 13, panel A, shows the results with the New York
exclusions. After the exclusions, no cases remain in which New York is
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the state of incorporation of the acquiring firm. Nevertheless, New
York is the choice of forum in 15 mergers. Choice of forum flows to
New York from Delaware corporations. Panel B shows that, after
excluding California businesses and attorneys, California is the choice
of forum in eight mergers. Both New York and California show an
inflow but New York's is more substantial, as in the case of choice of
law. The association between the state of incorporation and selection
of that state as the forum is statistically significant (p<.001) in both
tables.
Table 13. State of Incorporation and Choice of Forum,
Excluding New York and California Firms Located in Those
States or with Attorneys in Those States
Choice of forum
A. Excluding firms with place of business in NY and firms with attorneys located in
NY
Acquirer's state DE NY CA Other Total
of incorporation
DE (N)
Percent
CA (N)
Percent
Other (N)
Percent
Total (N)
Percent
36 7 15 18 76
47.37 9.21 19.74 23.68 100.00
0 1 4 2 7
0.00 14.29 57.14 28.57 100.00
7 7 11 45 70
10.00 10.00 15.71 64.29 100.00
43 15 30 65 153
28.10 9.80 19.61 42.48 100.00
B. Excluding firms with place of business in Calif. and firms with attorneys located in
Calif.
DE (N) 25 21 3 21 70
Percent 35.71 30.00 4.29 30.00 100.00
NY (N) 0 2 0 0 2
Percent 33.33 66.67 0.00 0.00 100.00
CA (N) 0 1 0 0 1
Percent 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
Other (N) 14 12 5 45 76
Percent 18.42 15.79 6.58 59.21 100.00
Total (N) 39 36 8 66 149
Percent 26.17 24.16 5.37 44.30 100.00
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, mergers, Jan. 2002 to July 2002.
Note. All states other than Delaware, New York, and California are coded as "Other." Excludes
mergers that designate both Delaware and New York law. Excludes mergers that do not
designate a choice of forum.
2006 [Vol. 59:6:1975
CORPORATE MERGER AGREEMENTS
Choice of forum occurs not only against a background of state
of incorporation but also against a background of choice of law. One
expects parties who have specified a choice of law to specify courts in
the chosen state as the forum for litigation. Table 14 supports this
belief. Its diagonal entries indicate that the forum chosen is
overwhelmingly the same as the law chosen, and the association is
highly statistically significant (p. <001). But Table 14 also indicates a
further flight from Delaware. Parties who choose Delaware law are
less likely to choose Delaware as a forum than parties who choose non-
Delaware law are to choose their choice of law as choice of forum.
Table 14. Choice of Law and Choice of Forum
Choice of forum
Choice of law DE NY CA Other Total
DE (N) 60 3 7 15 85
Percent 70.59 3.53 8.24 17.65 100.00
NY (N) 2 35 1 1 39
Percent 5.13 89.74 2.56 2.56 100.00
CA (N) 0 1 24 1 26
Percent 0.00 3.85 92.31 3.85 100.00
Other (N) 2 1 0 60 63
Percent 3.17 1.59 0.00 95.24 100.00
Total (N) 64 40 32 77 213
Percent 30.05 18.78 15.02 36.15 100.00
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, mergers, Jan. 2002 to July
2002. Note. All states other than Delaware, New York, and California are coded as "Other."
Excludes mergers that designate both Delaware and New York law. Excludes mergers that do
not designate a choice of forum.
B. Choice of Forum Regression Analysis
To facilitate regression analysis, we define a choice of forum
"flight" variable analogous to the choice of law flight variable. "Choice
of forum other than state of incorporation," (the choice of forum flight
variable) equals one when the acquiring firm's state of incorporation
and choice of litigation forum do not match. It equals zero when they
do match.
Table 15 summarizes this variable. It shows that Delaware
acquiring corporations tend to reject Delaware as a forum more than
other acquiring corporations tend to reject their states' courts. The
59.1 percent Delaware rejection rate is higher than the forty-seven
percent Delaware rejection rate with respect to choice of law shown in
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Table 7. The difference across all states of incorporation is statistically
significant at p=.027 (Fisher's exact test).
Table 15. Choice of Forum Other than State of Incorporation
Acquirer's state Choice of forum = state Choice of forum # state Total
of incorporation of incorporation of incorporation
DE (N) 47 68 115
Percent 40.87 59.13 100.00
NY(N) 4 0 4
Percent 100.00 20.00 100.00
CA (N) 4 5 9
Percent 44.44 55.56 100.00
Other (N) 49 39 88
Percent 55.68 44.32 100.00
Total (N) 104 112 216
Percent 48.15 51.85 100.00
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, mergers, Jan. 2002 to July 2002.
Note. All states other than Delaware, New York, and California are coded as "Other." Excludes
mergers that designate both Delaware and New York law. Excludes mergers that do not
designate a choice of forum.
Like choice of law, New York as an attorney locale, as an
acquirer's place of business, or as an acquired company's place of
business may attract New York as a forum. To examine whether these
features account for the flight from Delaware as a forum, the
Appendix reports a version of Table 15 that excludes cases with New
York attorneys or places of business. 55 Delaware corporations then
choose non-Delaware fora in fifty-four percent of mergers and the
sample as a whole chooses a forum other than the state of
incorporation in forty-four percent of mergers (analogous to Table 15's
total row). If one excludes mergers with California attorney or place-
of-business connections as well as mergers with these New York
connections, the results remain statistically significant (p=0.004).
Moreover, Table 15's difference in concordance between law
and forum suggests modeling concordance as a function of previously-
described factors associated with choice of law. Table 16 reports in
model (1) a regression model of Delaware as the choice of forum,
analogous to model (1) in Table 9. The large, positive coefficient on the
"Delaware law chosen" variable suggests that the most important
factor in choosing Delaware as a litigation forum is that Delaware law
have been designated the contract's governing law.
55. See infra app. tbl.A-2. The differences are statistically significant (p=0.049).
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Table 16. Logistic Regression Model of Choice of Forum Being
Delaware or a State Other than Acquirer's State of
Incorporation
Dependent variable
(2)
Delaware forum
chosen, excluding
mergers with NY
contacts
(3)
Choice of
forum t
choice of
law
(4)
Choice of forum
choice of law,
excluding
mergers with NY
contacts
Delaware law chosen
Acquirer public
Acquired firm public
Acquirer inc. in DE
Acquirer inc. in CA
Acquirer inc. in Other
Attorney bus. in CA
Attorney bus. in Other
Acquirer bus. in NY
Acquirer firm bus. in CA
Acquirer bus. in Other
Constant
Observations
4.721*
(7.25)
-0.390
(0.48)
1.509**
(3.46)
-0.426
(1.00)
-0.410
(0.95)
1.469*
(2.33)
-0.635
(1.31)
0.065
(0.01)
-1.422
(0.29)
-1.502
(0.31)
-2.593
(0.57)
208
3.844**
(5.90)
-0.179
(0.25)
1.126+
(1.80)
-1.034+
(1.85)
1.983*
(2.47)
-1.696*
(2.11)
-1.336**
(2.62)
-2.316**
(2.61)
145
1.422*
(2.22)
0.569
(0.54)
-0.313
(0.43)
1.060*
(2.05)
1.127
(1.28)
-1.535+
(1.78)
0.466
(1.15)
-3.713**
(3.18)
209
1.617+
(1.90)
0.136
(0.20)
0.955
(1.29)
1.882**
(2.61)
-2.048*
(2.51)
-2.816**
(6.88)
145
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, mergers, Jan. 2002 to July 2002.
Note. All states other than Delaware, New York, and California are coded as "Other." Excludes
mergers that designate both Delaware and New York law or that do not designate a choice of
forum. In model (2) exclusion of the New York business and attorney locale mergers leaves only
two California corporations, too few to include the "Acquirer=CA corporation" dummy variable in
the models without leading to unstable results. Reference category for place of incorporation is
Delaware in models (1) and (2), and Other in models (3) and (4). Reference category for attorney
place of business is New York in models (1) and (3) , Other in models (2) and (4), Reference
category for place of business is Delaware in models (1) and (2). Models account for clustering on
two-digit Standard Industrial Classification codes. The "Delaware law chosen" coefficients in
models (1) and (4) are not statistically significant in unclustered models. Bootstrap-based z
statistics are in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
(1)
Delaware
forum
chosen
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Table 16 also shows the importance of the acquired firm's
public status in selecting Delaware, as was the case for choice of law.
Model (2) explores this result with New York acquirer locale contracts
and New York attorney contracts excluded. New York corporations
choose New York law without variation so a regression model cannot
include a dummy variable for New York corporations. In addition, the
data in the restricted sample are too sparse to allow inclusion of
dummy variables for all our values of the acquiring firm's business
locale. Model (2) therefore includes dummy variables only for
California and Other as business locales. It yields results consistent
with model (1).
Table 16's models (3) and (4) assess whether contracts specify a
forum that differs from the choice of law. Model (4) again restricts the
sample by excluding firms with New York connections via business
locale or attorney. Both models indicate, consistently with Table 14,
that selecting Delaware law is associated with choosing a litigation
forum other than state designated as the choice of law, though the
marginally significant result in model (4) is sensitive to the use of
industry-level clustering.
VI. THE DECISION TO DESIGNATE CHOICE OF FORUM
Somewhat surprisingly, many merger contracts do not specify a
choice of forum. As shown in Table 17, only fifty-three percent of
contracts specified a forum for resolving disputes-a notable contrast
with the universal presence of choice of law clauses in the data set.56
Since many merger contracts do not specify a choice of forum, it is
interesting to explore factors that explain those that do. One expects
the attorney to play the major role in specifying whether a contract
designates a litigation forum. But one might not expect the rate of
designation to vary by the factors explored here. Designating a
litigation forum would seem to be a desirable contract term regardless
of locale. Table 17 summarizes the rate of specifying a litigation forum
by attorney locale. It shows that New York attorneys specify a
litigation forum in over seventy percent of the merger contracts. The
differences across locales are highly statistically significant (p<.001).
56. Our finding that contracting parties specify a forum much less frequently than they
specify governing law is consistent with Marotta-Wurgler's study of 597 end user software
license agreements, which found that 75% of the agreements contained a choice of law clause but
only 28% selected a forum. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, "Unfair" Choice of Law, Forum, and
Arbitration Clauses: Much Ado About Nothing?, in "BOILERPLATE": FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET
CONTRACTS (0. Ben-Shahar ed., forthcoming 2007).
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Table 17. Litigation Forum Specification by Attorney Locale
Atty. place of bus. Forum not specified Forum specified Total
NY (N) 18 49 67
Percent 26.87 73.13 100.00
CA (N) 30 44 74
Percent 40.54 59.46 100.00
Other (N) 146 125 271
Percent 53.87 46.13 100.00
Total (N) 194 218 334
Percent 47.09 52.91 100.00
Source. SEC EDGAR database, LEXIS EDGAR PLUS database, mergers, Jan. 2002 to July 2002.
The fact that New York attorneys more frequently designate a
forum is not a function of place of incorporation or locale. They tend to
designate a litigation forum more frequently than other attorneys
after accounting for place of incorporation and place of business. And,
as Table 12 shows, they do not overwhelmingly designate New York as
the forum.
VII. CONCLUSION
We report strong associations between both choice of law and
choice of forum and several factors: business locale, attorney locale,
and state of incorporation. Against the background of these
associations, Delaware's prominence as a place of incorporation drives
the simple descriptive story of choice of law and choice of forum. As
shown in Table 2, Delaware is the most frequent choice of both law
and forum. But Delaware's attractiveness as a place of incorporation is
noticeably stronger than its draw as a choice of law or forum. This
rticle reports significant outflows from Delaware towards New York
and California with respect to both choice of law and forum. These
results suggest that, other than corporate governance law, Delaware's
appeal to sophisticated corporations does not rest primarily on its law
or on its courts, however efficient or expert they may be. If Delaware's
non-corporate law were a positive attraction, one might expect
Delaware to at least be the choice of law for companies that chose to
incorporate in that state. If Delaware's courts exerted an attractive
force of equal intensity across legal areas, one would similarly expect
Delaware to be the forum of choice for firms that incorporate there.
The importance of our results depends in part on the view one
has of why Delaware attracts so many large corporations. If one
believes general judicial efficiency or clarity of law is part of
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Delaware's appeal, then our results provide somewhat contrary
evidence. If one believes that Delaware's appeal rests largely on its
corporate governance rules, then one might have a neutral ex ante
view on whether Delaware would be a magnet for choice of law or
choice of forum in merger contracts.
The results probably should be interpreted less to suggest that
Delaware has unattractive features than as an indication that factors
other than general law or forum drive corporate choice of law and
forum. Some factors are suggested by this study's findings of
associations between places of business and attorney locale and
associations between choice of law and forum, as described in Tables
4, 5, 11, and 12. Another factor is clearly shown by the finding that
mergers involving acquired public firms tend to choose Delaware law.
Delaware's corporate governance features likely drive this result. For
any particular set of merger partners, factors not readily observable in
our data likely drive the choice of law and forum.
Our results also generate an interesting new question. What
factors influence contracting parties to specify a choice of law but not a
choice of forum? We show here that although a governing law is
specified in every contract in our data set, a litigation forum was
specified in only slightly more than half the contracts. A partial
descriptive explanation emerges from New York attorneys' greater
tendency to specify a forum. But even New York attorneys do not
always specify a litigation forum. What factors lead so many other
attorneys to fail to specify one of the most important legal terms in a
contract should be the subject of further study.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A-1. CHOICE OF LAW OTHER THAN STATE OF
INCORPORATION (EXCLUDES CASES WITH NEW YORK ATTORNEYS OR
PLACES OF BUSINESS)
Acquirer's state of incorporation
DE
CA
Other
Total
Law chosen not state of incorporation
No Yes Total
74 51 125
59.20 40.80 100.00
15 3 18
83.33 16.67 100.00
113 48 161
70.19 29.81 100.00
202 102 304
66.45 33.55 100.00
Fisher's exact = 0.050
TABLE A-2. CHOICE OF FORUM OTHER THAN STATE OF
INCORPORATION (EXCLUDES CASES WITH NEW YORK ATTORNEYS OR
PLACES OF BUSINESS)
Acquirer's state of incorporation
DE
CA
Other
Total
Forum chosen not state of incorporation
No Yes Total
34 40 74
45.95 54.05 100.00
4 3 7
57.14 42.86 100.00
42 21 63
66.67 33.33 100.00
80 64 144
55.56 44.44 100.00
Fisher's exact = 0.049

